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Team:Paris Bettencourt/Modeling
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#Record your findings and implement them | #Record your findings and implement them | ||
#Review your assessment and update if necessary | #Review your assessment and update if necessary | ||
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| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| '''What are the hazards?''' | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| '''Who might be harmed and how?''' | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| '''What are we already doing?''' | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| '''What further action is necessary?''' | ||
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| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| GE bacteria outcompete natural strains | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| GE bacteria escaping the containment may outcompete natural strains if they have better fitness, creating natural imbalance | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| Using harmless strain or strain with low fitness compared to natural strain (standard E coli for lab) | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| Designing a safety containment to prevent the cells reproducing themselves at some point and/or separating them from natural strains | ||
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| + | |- | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| Other strain/species may uptake engineered gene, and if the gene gives advantage in the fitness, it may outcompete other strain and creating natural imbalance | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| - | ||
| + | | style="border:0.035cm solid #000000;padding:0.176cm;"| Designing a safety containment to degrade DNA and/or separate the DNA from the environment and/or prevent natural strain having advantages from the DNA | ||
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| + | |} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 16:33, 26 October 2012
- Main
- Team
- Project
- Achievements
- Human Practice
- Safety
- Notebook
- Attributions
Overview
Delay system
Semantic containment
Restriction enzyme system
MAGE
Suicide system
Encapsulation
Synthetic import domain
Safety Questions
Safety AssessmentContents |
Overview
Safety is an important issue in synthetic biology, especially on environmental related projects. We already tried to answer the question, “how safe is safe enough?” by involving experts, publics and scientists, and also building biosafety devices. However, to really answer the question, actually we need first to ask ourselves a more basic question, “how do we measure safety?”. As we see synthetic biology as an engineering approach to biology, we could think about adaptation of safety engineering, a well studied engineering subset, that has been widely use to minimize risks on many fields of engineering, such as mechanical engineering, aircrafts, and manufactures. However, the risks they face are surely different from the risks of synthetic biology. Here we propose an approach to assess safety for environmental release of genetically engineered bacteria (GE bacteria).
Background
According to Dana et al1 there are four areas of risk research in environmental application of synthetic biology:
- Differences in the physiology of natural and synthetic organisms will affect how they interact with the surrounding environment,
- Escaped microorganisms have the potential to survive in receiving environments and to compete successfully with non-modified counterparts,
- Synthetic organisms might evolve and adapt quickly, perhaps filling new ecological niches, and
- Gene transfer.
Knowing that there are different areas of risk that we need to take into account, we need to design our safety containment with different parts to deal with each of them. Identifying the relationship between one part and the others will help us to see the reliability of the overall system.
Objectives
- Adapting existing safety assessment tools to synthetic biology.
- Proposing methods to assess safety in synthetic biology.
Methods and Results
We propose a method to assess hazards and risk2 in releasing genetically engineered bacteria to the environment. As a case study, we want to release GE bacteria which will perform some function in the environment and we want to apply 3 sets of bWARE safety containment (alginate beads, bWARE killswitch, semantic containment) to control the hazards and risks. Here we focus more on the reliability of the safety containment system rather than the functional part, although the similar assessment can also be applied to see the functional part reliability.
Hazards Identification
Identifying hazards means that we need to find and understand the possible harm that may happen in the application of our system. Generally there are two potential hazard in environmental application of synthetic biology1 which are the success escape of the GE bacteria followed by a success competition with the natural strain and the horizontal gene transfer.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment will give an idea what kind of risk we face in releasing the GEO in the environment and help to design the safety containment. Here we adapt a risk management method in workplaces complying with health and safety law 3.
To-do-list to assess risk in 5 steps:
- Identify the hazards
- Decide who might be harmed and how
- Evaluate the risks and decide on precaution
- Record your findings and implement them
- Review your assessment and update if necessary
| What are the hazards? | Who might be harmed and how? | What are we already doing? | What further action is necessary? |
| GE bacteria outcompete natural strains | GE bacteria escaping the containment may outcompete natural strains if they have better fitness, creating natural imbalance | Using harmless strain or strain with low fitness compared to natural strain (standard E coli for lab) | Designing a safety containment to prevent the cells reproducing themselves at some point and/or separating them from natural strains |
| Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) | Other strain/species may uptake engineered gene, and if the gene gives advantage in the fitness, it may outcompete other strain and creating natural imbalance | - | Designing a safety containment to degrade DNA and/or separate the DNA from the environment and/or prevent natural strain having advantages from the DNA |
References
1 - Genya V Dana et al. Four steps to avoid a synthetic biology disaster. 2012. Nature vol 483
2 - WorkSafe Victoria. A handbook for workplaces, controlling OHS hazards and risks. 2007. Edition No.1
3 - “Five steps to risk assessment” from [http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/fivesteps.htm http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/fivesteps.htm]. - risk management method in workplaces complying with health and safety law
