Team:Paris Bettencourt/Human Practice/Overview

From 2012.igem.org

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#'''''Interviews with experts''''' which enabled us to have a broad overview of the state of the art. [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/Interview Read More]
#'''''Interviews with experts''''' which enabled us to have a broad overview of the state of the art. [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/Interview Read More]
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#'''''We screened previous iGEM team’s wikis''''' to trace the evolution of biosafety concerns in the iGEM competition when it comes to releasing genetically modified bacteria in the wild. We especially examined the containment systems that have been proposed. [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/WikiScreen Read More]
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#'''''We screened previous iGEM team’s wikis''''' to trace the evolution of biosafety concerns and devices in the iGEM community, focusing on proposed containment systems. [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/WikiScreen Read More]
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#'''''We set the bar for risk at horizontal gene transfer'''''. Therefore HGT is what we are trying to prevent.
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#'''''We focused on horizontal gene transfer as main generic risk factor'''''.  
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#'''''We wrote a report''''' where we addressed the concerns raised by synthetic biology per se, that is, as a technique. Then, we analyzed the specific concerns that arise from synthetic biology’s potential applications in nature.  [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/Report Read More]
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#'''''Synthetic report''''' where we addressed the concerns raised by synthetic biology per se, that is, as a technique. Then, we analyzed the specific concerns that arise from synthetic biology’s potential applications in nature.  [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/Report Read More]
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#:* '''''The need of a discussion''''' between society’s different protagonists to set goals, define what they would consider as benefits and acceptable risks (B),
#:* '''''The need of a discussion''''' between society’s different protagonists to set goals, define what they would consider as benefits and acceptable risks (B),
# Best research practice:
# Best research practice:
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#:* Nowadays, a '''''risk 0 is impossible to achieve''''' as no containment system can be 100% safe (bacteria can always escape by mutations)  (C),   
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#:* '''''Zero risk is impossible to achieve''''' as no containment system can be 100% safe (bacteria can always escape by mutations)  (C),   
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#:* There is a '''''lack of quantitative data evaluating the probability of failure of containment systems''''' (D),
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#:* There is a '''''lack of quantitative data evaluating the probability of failure of any synthetic biology engineered system, in particular containment systems''''' (D),
#:*  There is a '''''lack of quantitative data evaluating the risk of HGT assuming containment systems failed''''' (E),
#:*  There is a '''''lack of quantitative data evaluating the risk of HGT assuming containment systems failed''''' (E),
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#:* The compiling of the wiki screen shows that '''''no containment systems created in iGEM is robust''''': they are all one mutation away from failure. We call for more biosafety in iGEM (F),
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#:* The compiling of the wiki screen shows that '''''no containment systems created in iGEM is robust''''': they lack the above quantification and are mostly one mutation away from failure. We call for major effort of the iGEM community to quantify available containment systems and search for new solutions (F),
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#:* '''''The need for an INDEPENDENT committee of scientists''''' to test any application of synthetic biology that requires releasing in the environment (G),  
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#:* '''''The need for an INDEPENDENT cohort of scientists''''' to test experimentally any application of synthetic biology that requires releasing in the environment (G),  
You can find the full list of conclusions [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/Report here]
You can find the full list of conclusions [https://2012.igem.org/Team:Paris_Bettencourt/Human_Practice/Report here]

Revision as of 22:57, 26 September 2012


iGEM Paris Bettencourt 2012

Human Practice

Aim

To chart new venues of best practice for synthetic biology. To this end, we examined the ethical, biological and social concerns related to the release of genetically modified bacteria in the wild.

Metodology

  1. Interviews with experts which enabled us to have a broad overview of the state of the art. Read More
  2. We screened previous iGEM team’s wikis to trace the evolution of biosafety concerns and devices in the iGEM community, focusing on proposed containment systems. Read More
  3. We focused on horizontal gene transfer as main generic risk factor.
  4. Synthetic report where we addressed the concerns raised by synthetic biology per se, that is, as a technique. Then, we analyzed the specific concerns that arise from synthetic biology’s potential applications in nature.  Read More


Main Conclusions

  1. Societal interaction:
    • The need to raise awareness of synthetic biology in the population so people can decide in the most enlightened way possible if they want of this new technology and of its applications (A),
    • The need of a discussion between society’s different protagonists to set goals, define what they would consider as benefits and acceptable risks (B),
  2. Best research practice:
    • Zero risk is impossible to achieve as no containment system can be 100% safe (bacteria can always escape by mutations) (C),
    • There is a lack of quantitative data evaluating the probability of failure of any synthetic biology engineered system, in particular containment systems (D),
    • There is a lack of quantitative data evaluating the risk of HGT assuming containment systems failed (E),
    • The compiling of the wiki screen shows that no containment systems created in iGEM is robust: they lack the above quantification and are mostly one mutation away from failure. We call for major effort of the iGEM community to quantify available containment systems and search for new solutions (F),
    • The need for an INDEPENDENT cohort of scientists to test experimentally any application of synthetic biology that requires releasing in the environment (G),

You can find the full list of conclusions here

Main Proposals

  1. Societal interaction:
    • Organizing a workshop on synthetic biology and a tour of our lab for 60high school students, (addresses issue A and B) Read More. Ultimately, we would like interaction with high school or middle school students to be a requirement for an iGEM gold medal.
    • Organizing a debate with 10 non expert students from various background, and then opening the debate to the floor (the public), which was made up of both experts and non experts, (addresses issue A and B) Read More.
  2. Best research practice:
    • Creating a system as robust as possible, that is many mutations away from failure (this is what our bench work has been all about) (addresses issue C and F),
    • Creating a safety page on the biobrick registry where all the safety devices that exist are listed and characterized (included evaluation of their robustness) in order for iGEM teams to pick the most appropriate device to add to their newly created genetic circuit. Ultimately, we would like the integration of safety modules and risks assessments to be part of of every synthetic biology project from the very start (already listed in the safety page or created de novo by the team) (addresses issue D, F), [http://partsregistry.org/Biosafety Go to safety page]
    • Making a list of proposals


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