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Revision as of 12:43, 24 September 2012
1. PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
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Synthetic biology aspires to be an engineering discipline, with the aim of constructing artificial living systems as means to human ends. The products of synthetic biology ought to be living machines. The ‘international Genetically Engineered Machine competition’ is respectively raising a whole generation of future scientists trained in the methods of this novel field of synthetic biology. We believe that in this context the ‘Know How’ (procedure) needs to be accompanied with the ‘Know Why’ (causal knowledge), but mostly with the often forgotten ‘Know What’ (meaning), because the emerging of every new engineering discipline brings not only chances but also risks, uncertainties, and worries. There is no doubt that the synthetic biology promises a large number of meaningful applications and solutions for many present problems, but, at the same time, many social, ethical and legal problems are being revealed by the claim of the creation of ‘artificial living systems’ or ‘living machines’. We need to ask ourselves ‘what are we actually doing?’, ‘what are living machines good for?’ and also ‘what are they in themselves?’. Any ad-hoc answer to these questions would lead to a misjudgement of the arising problems.
Our iGEM-team tried to leave aside any preconceived opinion and to make a profound critical analysis of the actual source of the nascent public concerns (dual-use-dilemma, ‘playing god’, biosafety, biosecurity, etc). We did not only meet for lab meeting but for philosophical evenings as well among us and with scholars from diverse sciences to discuss core philosophical aspects of synthetic biology, focussing the discussion gradually on the ontology of the products of synthetic biology (see Chronicle of philosophical evenings [Hyperlink XXX]). What do we actually mean with expressions like ‘living machines’ and ‘artificial life’? For that, we studied modern approaches of philosophy of language (e.g. theory of conceptual metaphors), philosophy of technology (e.g. ICE-theory for the ascription of technical functions), philosophy of biology (e.g. organisation account of biological functions) and diverse bioethical theories (e.g. Taylor’s biocentric position). Through our deliberations, we came to the conclusion that many apparent ontological and ethical problems concerning synthetic biology and its aimed products are actually epistemological and semantical ones, which arise due to its ‘intentional epistemology’ and the unreflective use of innovative metaphors such as ‘living machine’. Our analysis pointed out important epistemological deficits of synthetic biology such as the unjustified methodological principle of ‘knowing by doing’, a tailor-made notion of life and the metaphoric character of its main terms. Pablo Rodrigo Grassi, one of our team members, took the challenge and collected the different thoughts of our discussions building a coherent text:
The analysis of the innovative term ‘living machine’ in this essay describes a novel argumentation, which combines advanced theories of philosophy of technology and philosophy of biology and allows us to make clear distinctions between organisms and machines. Out of the exposed accounts in the essay, is it justified to assert that living beings emerge and develop ‘naturally’ and under no circumstances dependent on human agency. This makes any ontological distinction between ‘living machines’ and ‘living organisms’ and between ‘artificial life’ and ‘natural life’ pointless. Therefore, it is not warranted to use hybrid expressions (e.g. ‘synthetic life’, ‘living machines’, ‘genetically engineered machines’) as proper terms, yet as metaphors. This essay argues for the reflexive and not constitutive use of metaphors in the language of the synthetic biology in order to avoid faulty inferences. On the one hand, this essay enables to allay the global unease concerning the idea of creation of life and the notion of ‘living machine’, because, according to our argumentation, no creation of life and no ‘living machine’ are possible at all. And on the other hand, this essay shows some important aspects which are required for consolidating a clear and coherent epistemology of synthetic biology. Moreover based on the conduced analysis of biological functions in our essay, the outline of a consistent biocentric ethic which also includes the products of synthetic biology, is possible. The full essay can be downloaded here:
